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THE TIME HAS COME TO TALK OF MAJOR
CURTAILMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
JURISDICTION
FRANK R. STRONG*

"The Time has come," the Walrus said, "To talk of many things: Of
shoes-and ships-and sealing wax-Of cabbages-and kings-And
why the sea is boiling hot-And whether pigs have wings."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass

By commencing with this familiar quotation the writer does not mean
to concede any close likeness to his fellow mammal even though he does
admit to inhabiting the murky waters of the law. Nor is he concerned
with the items that were of moment to Alice's friend. Yet the quote is
apt, for in the writer's considered opinion the time has definitely come for
serious talk of major curtailment in the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States. This judgment stems not from irritation with
the Court but from concern for its future. There is no desire to join with
those who continue to cry for restriction of the Court's jurisdiction in
reapportionment, criminal procedure, or school prayer. Rather, this article
is written in the constructive spirit that marked the drafting, enactment
and acceptance of the Judges' Bill of 1925.1
Familiar are recently expressed concerns with regard to the quality
of the Court's work product. More than a decade ago, Professors Bickel
and Wellington instanced the outpouring of per curiams following upon
2
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,

which can only in the loosest way be held to be governed by the
decision of May 11, 1954. This is not to say that the per curiam
orders were wrong. Nor is it to say that they could not be founded
in reason, only that the Court made no effort to do so.8
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Dean and Professor of
Law Emeritus, The Ohio State University.
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. Known as the Judges' Bill because drafted

by a committee of Supreme Court justices, the Act greatly expanded the Court's
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction with corresponding restriction of its obligatory
appeal jurisdiction. The avowed purpose of this shift was that of reducing the
Court's case burden.

U.S. 483 (1954).
& Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1957).
2347

'Bickel
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On the same count they were critical of the Brown opinion itself, of
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer4 before that, and of Wilson v.
Girard,5 which followed Brown by two Terms. The charge was that
[t]he Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by
little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do
not opine and of per curiam orders that.quite frankly fail to build the
bridge between the authorities they cite and the results they decree.(
These disturbing observations were but prologue to the authors' finding of deficiency in the Court's handling of Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills' at the levels of both statutory and constitutional interpretation.
In Lincoln Mills, as we shall attempt to show, difficulties of statutory
construction overlying issues of federalism and of the proper function
of the federal courts were disposed of in assertive fashion with little
apparent consideration of their implications. The disposition was virtually without "opinion," if by opinion we mean rationally articulated
8
grounds of decision.
Judging the majority opinion against the "facts and background" of the
case and the "purpose of Congress and the function of the Court," the two
Yale writers were satisfied that they had proved their point. "Thus
was this determination of far-reaching consequences rendered without
opinion." 9
This appraisal was made as of 1957. In reviewing the 1965 Term of
Court, Professor Kurland, after quoting the second of the three passages
set forth above, declared that
[b] ecause of a recent tendency to add disingenuousness and misrepresentation to this list, the problem has been exacerbated rather than
cured in the years since Professors Bickel and Wellington spoke.10
Among other faults he found "a lack of workmanlike performance in
reaching the results" of the reapportionment cases from Baker v. Carr
'343 U.S. 579 (1952).
354 U.S. 524 (1957).
' Bickel & Wellington, supra note 3, at 3.
7353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'Bickel & Wellington, supra note 3, at 6.
9Id. 37.
"0Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government," 78 HAv. L. Rav. 143, 145 (1964).
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through Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly."' Although Dean
McKay has had no difficulty whatsoever with the question of one-man,
one-vote,1 2 Professor Auerbach required the greater part of one hundred
pages to satisfy himself of the less-easily-come-by-proposition of one-vote,
one-value,' and others still have not been able to master the new judicial
mathematics.' 4 The overall Kurland appraisal is contained in the following
paragraph:
If it is inappropriate to expect elegance from a Court dedicated to
egalitarianism, it is not unreasonable to hope for workmanlike quality.
It is, nevertheless, an unfulfilled wish. Since example must again
suffice, only one of the Court's more egregious "stylistic" faults will
be considered here: the failure of the Court to provide guidance for
later litigation. In part this is due to the substitution of "hallowed
catchword and formula" in place of reasons. "One man, one vote,"
"Men vote, trees don't," "apartheid," and "public accommodations"
hardly provide guidance for the resolution of cases that are not quite
so simple as simple-minded people would make them. Similarly,
rhetoric may be helpful advocacy, emotionally appealing, even entertaining, but without more it does not solve problems; rather, it tends
to cover the absence of a reasoned solution. Open avowal of an incapacity to formulate a standard is more commendable for its honesty
but is equally unhelpful to judges and litigants in later cases. But
probably the most serious contribution to confusion is the disdain with
which the Court treats its own precedents. A Court that considers
its pronouncements to be "the law of the land," might be expected to
pay more respect to its own opinions. And yet the fairly substantial
number of cases mentioned in this paper in which the Court overruled
its own precedents, either openly or covertly, are only samples. The
increase in the rate of acceleration in recent years is noteworthy.' 5
11
Id. 149-56, discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368 (1963); Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713 (1964).
2"Perhaps it is just too easy to say that 'equal' means 'equal' when individual
rights are involved." R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
EQUAL REPRESENTATION 139 (1965).
"2Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,
One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
't See M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 245 (1964), in
which the author observed that "Americans have reached a consensus that a proportion of eighteen to one is a hindrance to democracy. Neither they nor we,
however, can say that a one to one proportion always maximizes democracy." See
also Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 252.
" Kurland, supra note 10, at 169-70.
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Dissatisfaction with the Court's work in the antitrust field has been
common. The area is one of statutory interpretation although, as Chief
Justice Hughes once observed, the basic statute, the Sherman Act, "has
a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in
constitutional provisions."' 16 Concluding a 1961 study of major decisions
of the Court with respect to exclusive arrangements under section 3 of
the Clayton Act, Professor, and now Dean, Bok observed:
In the last few years, increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed
by careful observers over the craftsmanship of Supreme Court opinions.
Summary reversals in controversial cases, hasty generalizations about
complicated issues, loosely analyzed opinions-all these charges and
more have been laid at the door of the justices. There is much that
seems to confirm these criticisms in the recent Court decisions on exclusive dealing. In failing to explore or even recognize a tenable middle
ground between stark prohibition and exhaustive inquiry, Standard
Stations can be termed an "inadequately reasoned opinion." A study
.

of the dissent in Motion Pictures Advertising suggests that the

majority opinion in that case was characterized by "the sweeping dogmatic statement" whereby "issues are ducked which in good lawyership
and good conscience ought not to be ducked." Tampa Electric, though
it cleared the ground for doctrinal reform, can doubtless be numbered
among the opinions that do not "genuinely illumine the area of law with
which they deal."' 7
Through the years Professor Milton Handler has also been critical
of the Court's antitrust opinions. Writing in 1964 on recent merger cases,
he declared that from the beginning "our merger jurisprudence has been
unstable, obscure, and confused" and quoted the following stricture from
his comprehensive study of earlier merger cases, published in 1932:
The... opinions of the Supreme Court are singularly free of enlightenment .... [They] are . . .inconsistent and . . .hopelessly con-

fused... [and] marked by a disheartening lack of candor .... Conflicting theories, divergent explanations of the facts and opposing contentions form an impenetrable jungle of words.18
Inadequacies found by him in later merger opinions he devastatingly
critiqued through an imaginary opinion in which the Court majority
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933).
Bok, The Tampa Electric Case, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 320.
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63 MIcHl. L. Rnv. 59, 67-68
(1964), combining evaluations made in Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 179, 183, 271 (1932).
18
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directed divestiture of the assets of Victor's Meat Market Co. by Joe's
Delicatessen, Inc., each of which operated, in competition with other
businesses of like nature, at the intersection of K and 21st Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. The "Court's opinion" was by Mr. Justice Christopher
Columbus Brown, the dissent by Mr. Justice Lucius Quintus Vespucius. 19
Quite recently, in his twentieth annual review of antitrust developments, Professor Handler concluded in this vein:
Last spring the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association conducted a symposium on the Supreme Court and the antitrust
laws from the viewpoint of the expositor, the defender and the critic.
The role of the critic fell to me, and I endeavored to assay the Court's
contributions to the substantive law, contrasting the doctrines of the
Warren Court with those of its predecessors. The over-all verdict was
quite favorable, the pluses more than outweighing the minuses. I pointed
out, however, that many of the Court's critics are troubled by its juristic
technique. Eminent scholars from many fields have commented upon
the tendency toward over-generalization, the disregard of precedents,
even those of recent vintage, the needless obscurity of opinions, the
discouraging lack of candor, the disdain for the fact finding of the
lower courts and the tortured reading of statutes. I found that these
observations could readily be documented in the antitrust field. I believe
that the decisions just reviewed further document the infirmities in the
Court's present methodology.
We at the bar, whether we like it or not, must accept the fact that
the Court is going to make major policy and will continue its activist
role. What is vital is that the Court make wise policy, but this is
unlikely unless it employs the proper methodology. The results reached
by the Court may be entirely right, but it is important for a healthy
jurisprudence that the results be reached for the right reasons. The
reader of an opinion is entitled to know the whys and the wherefores
for a change of doctrine. If the prior law represented bad policy, he
should be informed of the respects in which it was unsound; he should
not have to guess why the new rule is to be preferred. Policy postulates
should be explicit. Difficulties should be faced and'not evaded. Fact
finding must be scrupulously accurate. Embarrassing facts should not
be swept under the rug. Candor, which is the hallmark of mature jurisprudence, demands full explication.2 0
" Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1964, 63, MIcH. L. REv. 59, 70-71

(1964).
"Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53

VA.

L. IEv.
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Professor Thomas Kauper has been equally critical of the antitrust
decisions of the Warren Court.21 Lack of candor, inadequate methodology,
strained construction of statutes, and other deficiencies in the Court's
judicial process have brought him in three years of teaching near to the
cynicism he finds prevalent among not only the antitrust bar but government antitrust lawyers and law students as well. Two paragraphs giving
the gist of his concern can be lifted for quotation without doing violence
to context:
The attitude with which I am concerned is something more than
fundamental disagreement with the results reached by the Court; there
is obviously a difference between good faith criticism and cynicism.
The cynicism of which I speak concerns the Court's methods-the
decision-making process itself. This is not to suggest that it is an
attitude wholly unconcerned with the result of the cases, or that,
indeed, it does not reflect some good faith disagreement with the
policies being applied. But for the most part, cynicism has developed
because of the one-sidedness of the decisions, not because of their
22
merits.
The antitrust accomplishments of the Warren Court have been many.
As in other substantive areas it has led, not followed. It has led reluctant lower courts and, on occasion, a reluctant Department of
Justice. But methodology is an important aspect of leadership, even
for those in positions of power. A leader with a just cause may fail
not because his cause is unacceptable but because his methods are
wrong. This is the dilemma the Court now faces. Faced with increasing cynicism and distrust among many of those it seeks to lead,
there is at least some danger that it may become a Pied Piper with an
23
unheeded tune.
So familiar and universal has been the "torrent of criticism" leveled
at the obscenity decisions of the Court that this facet of dissatisfaction with
Court performance need only be remarked. Writing in the wake of
Ginsburg v. United States, 4 Professor Magrath found it "necessary to
insist, respectfully but firmly, that the Court has turned the law of
1667, 1668-69 (1967). To similar effect is Handler, Through the Antitrust Look-

ing Glass-Twenty-FirstAnnual Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 182 (1969).
"1T. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitruest Laws: Of Economics,
Populism and Cynicism, 67 MIcHr. L. REv. 325 (1968).
22
Id. 336.
2Id. 342.
24383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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obscenity into a constitutional disaster area." 25 Ginsberg v. New York 28
only complicated matters by overlaying requirements of literary value and
absence of pandering with the concept of variable obscenity, although one
sympathetic commentator believes that given time the Court will yet "have
painted itself out of a corner.

27

In the important area of federal taxation the Court has been the butt
of two-edged criticism. Its decisions have been far from satisfying while
its growing refusal to grant certiorari in tax cases has aroused widespread
dissatisfaction. At the beginning .of the present decade the late Professor
Lowndes opened an analysis of the quality of the Court's tax decisions .by
asserting that "[i]t is time to rescue the Supreme Court from federal
28
taxation; it is time to rescue federal taxation from the Supreme Court.
Political scientist Martin Shapiro has been no less critical; the Court's
"present hesitant attitude imparts a confusion and vagueness to the
corpus of tax law that appear undesirable in terms of the Court's general
institutional interest in the quality of the legal system." 29 At the same
time it is no secret that tax practitioners are bitter over the Court's failure
to hear the number of tax cases essential to maintain reasonable uniformity among the lower federal courts. These practitioners are hesitant
to commit their intense feelings to print, but orally they overflow with critical comment. Judge Tannenwald of the Tax Court has recently spoken
out, however:
The real problem comes from lack of uniformity. There are ten
Circuit Courts of Appeals making different decisions, sitting over an
even greater number of District Courts who make even more varied
decisions and a Supreme Court which does not take many tax cases 80
Twenty-five years ago Dean Griswold began to call for a Court of Tax
Appeals,3 with more and more joining the cry as the unsatisfactory situation worsens on both counts of "malfeasance" and "nonfeasance."
" Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7, 59.
"390
U.S. 629 (1968).
" Krislov, From Ginsburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in
Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 197.
" Lowndes, Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1960 Sue. CT. REv. 222.
9 M. SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 172. The judgment passed by Dr. Shapiro
follows upon a chapter of analysis of Supreme Court performance in federal tax
cases.
asTannenwald, After Trial-How a Case Is Decided,
in 27 NEw Yonic UNIERSITY INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL TAXATION 1505, 1515 (J. Sellin ed. 1969).
"1Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HAgv. L. REv. 1153
(1944). See pp. 11-13 infra.
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. . Returning to an overall evaluation of the quality of the Court's work,
one notes that Professor Henkin found grounds for disappointment in
reviewing the Court's 1967 Term.
My difficulties last Term-not limited to any one Justice, or group
or "wing"-derive from what might appear as two general operations
in the Warren Court's latest campaign-"mopping up" and "withdrawing from too-advanced positions." In some areas the Court has gone
on to complete what, in logic and principle, earlier cases had foretold;
elsewhere it saw the error of earlier ways, stopped and abandoned untenable positions. Unfortunately, the Court's judgment can be faulted
both in its advances and its retreats, for logic and principle apparently
2
did not determine where the Court went or stopped-as in mens rea.8
Proceeding to detailed analysis, he concluded that in the mens rea series
33
of Lambert-Robinson-Powell
the distinctions there attempted "afford
34
little intellectual comfort" ; decried the result in the draft-card burning
case 5 on the ground that "[a] constitutional distinction between speech
and conduct is specious" because "[s]peech is conduct, and actions
7
speak" 6 ; and criticized the decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
as one in which the Court could not resist the temptation "to give the
country statutes which no Congress ever enacted." '
But more than this, Professor Henkin expressed dissatisfaction with
lines currently drawn by the Court for determining when it will hear a
case at all. With respect to standing, Flast v. Cohen3 0 is to him, as it is
to this writer, a great disappointment despite its partial relaxation of
Frothinghamv. Mellon.4" "That the distinctions legislated by the Court
have no foundation in any relevanit considerations and make no intrinsic
sense is amply demonstrated in Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent (as Mr.
Justice Douglas, concurring, seems to admit).""' As for the several cases,
principally Mora v. McNamara,4 2 in which the Court stopped at the
',

Henkin, On Drawing Lines, foreword to The Supreme Court, 1967 Ternt, 82

HARV. L. REv. 63, 65 (1968).

" Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
" Henkin, supra note 32, at 69.
"5United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"Henkin,, supra note 32, at 79.
' 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
"Henkin, supra note 32, at 83.
"392 U.S: 83 (1968).
'O262 U.S. 447 (1923).
",Henkin, supra note 32, at 74.
" 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
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threshold all efforts to test judicially the constitutionality of peacetime
and wartime compulsory military service, "[o]ne might ask whether, in
such cases and in such times, the Court should not have heard argument
and written opinions." 4 3 Certainly the opinion in Baker v. Carr left
the doctrine of "political questions" in a fuzzy state. If the Court should
avoid the military service question on grounds of "discretion" or "statesmanship," Professor Ilenkin would "be happier, in general, if statesmanship and discretion were framed in principle, if the Court would demonstrate that the decision to hear or not to hear a constitutional claim is
based on something sturdier than caprice." 4' 4
In a most comprehensive evaluation of the "craftsmanship of the
Supreme Court," employing as tests six of Professor Lon Fuller's eight
"minimal standards required to maintain the legal system,"4 5 Professor
Ovid Lewis has recently concluded:
Although it is admittedly impossible for rules of law alone to provide
an adequate basis for resolution of the perplexing and difficult cases
that are heard by a court of last resort, it does not follow that the
opinions that justify difficult decisions cannot display a rational, comprehensible, and consistent rule which will provide some degree of
"regularity, reckonability, and justice." 46
The deficiencies he finds in Court opinions he lays in summary to "[t]he
activism of the Court, the device of prospective overruling, the appearance
of propounding the desirable as well as the constitutional, the use of
sweeping generalizations, the disregard for precedent, the resolution of
polycentric problems in ad hoc fashion . . . ."" Under the scrutinous
analysis of Professor Lewis, the Court's performance is less than adequate
on each of the six tests. For instance, in concluding his evaluation of
Court craftsmanship against the standard of "congruence between the
law-in-books and the law-in-action," he notes that "[t]he failure of the
Court to fashion appropriate and precise rules, sufficiently differentiated
for guidance in administrative law situations, has led Professor Kenneth
Davis to suggest:
'H Henkin,

supra note 32, at 89.
"Id. 91. Professor Henkin wrote prior to the decision in Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
'EL. FULLER, THE. MORALITY OF LAw 39 (1964).
,' Lewis, The High Court: Final . . But Fallible, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
528, 642 (1968).
17 Id. 640.
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(1) The Court probably should write fewer general essays in its
opinions and it should give more meticulous care to the ones it does
write. (2) The Court should take greater advantage of the values of
case-by-case development of law. (3) The Court should make further
effort to reduce the frequency of contradictory holdings, and it should
check its apparently growing tendency to indulge in easy generalizations that are misleading if read literally. (4) The Court should have
greater respect for its holdings and its own opinions; without restricting
its freedom to overrule, it should restrict its freedom to violate its own
doctrine. (5) The Court should inquire whether it is often too lighthearted about the manipulation of technical doctrine in order to produce
48
desired substantive results in particular cases."
It would be major oversimplification to assign to any one consideration full explanation of the deficiencies, whether of "malfeasance" or of
"nonfeasance," so commonly found in the Court's work-product. Professors Bickel and Wellington, in their criticism, laid the blame for vacuity
in constitutional decisions at the door of Court effort to protect itself
against bitter attack from the Right.49 With respect to antitrust decisions,
Professor Shapiro has asserted that "[i]t is the policy and not the Court
that is at fault, if fault there be."' 0 That policy requires the individual
justices to master the economics of industrial bigness, a feat that may be
too much to expect. 8 It is to be noted that Professor Bok's criticism,
earlier quoted, was followed by his wondering "whether the same critique
'5 2
could not be made of every period in the history of the antitrust laws."
And while Professor Henkin alludes at one point to the "strong view
that the Court is already overworked," he does not directly ascribe to
this consideration the inadequacy of major results at the 1967 Termresults which strike him "as symptoms of a particular kind of insufficiency,
reflecting some resistance to the limits of the judicial function, and some
impatience with the processes, the difficulties, the constraints of principled

decision."5'

The Court's predicament in the obscenity cases must be laid

essentially to the inherent conceptual difficulties involved; it is questionable that even with unlimited opportunity for reflection the Court
could draw the constitutional line with general satisfaction.

'I8 d. 582, quoting from 1 K. DAvis, ADmINIsTmATIvz LAw TREATIsE at v
(1958).
"Bickel &Wellington, .epra note 3, at 3.
30 M. SHAPmno, supra note 14, at 326.
= But Professor Kauper is less charitable. T. Kauper, supra note 21, at 339.
5 Bok, supra note 17, at 320.
H
Henkin,
supra note 32, at 92.
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Yet there is ample basis for ascribing to the Court's current workload
a considerable portion of the total responsibility for informed and responsible discontent with its overall performance. This conclusion must
be true as regards the Court's failure to bring uniformity to the law of
the federal specialties; surely the present unsatisfactory situation is not
the consequence of a judicial policy favoring conflict and confusion in those
important matters. It is also true with respect to the doctrines of standing
and political question, which Professor Henkin found to be in such an
unprincipled state. 4 The tortuous reasoning of Chief Justice Warren in
Flastbears clear earmarks of concern lest major relaxation of the requirements for standing in constitutional cases open the flood gates to heavier
Court workload. With "political questions," the time pressure on the
Court plays a dual role of cause and effect; there is the hazard of additional, and delicate, litigation were time to permit the Court to attain
the level of mature reflection that would disclose that all constitutional
issues by their very nature present political questions, thus rendering
fictional any judicial effort to seal some off as judicially non-cognizable
unless expressly so made by the Constitution. Professor Kurland has
laid at the door of judicial overload much of the blame for what he
colorfully described as "a deeper and wider 'credibility gap'" than that
between President Johnson and the citizenry: "the inadequate reasons
put forth by the Supreme Court in support of its judgments." 55
That the caseload with which the Court struggles has grown to alarming proportions, resulting in adverse effect on the quality of the Court's
product, was the thesis of the late Professor Henry Hart a decade ago ;56
and although both a judge and a justice immediately discounted the alarm
as a myth,57 the Hart thesis continues to be accepted by many responsible
Court-watchers. 58 Finding inadequacy in Judge Arnold's and Justice
Douglas' replies to Professor Hart, Dean Griswold, now Solicitor General
of the United States, insisted:
See pp. 8-9 supra.

Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less and Explain More, N.Y. Times,

June 9, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 34, reprinted with slight condensation in Hearings
on the Supreme Court Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 645 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on the Supreme Court].
5
6 Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, foreword to The Supreme Court, 1958
Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959).
" Arnold, Professor Harts Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298 (1960); Douglas,
The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1960).
' In noting the passing of Professor Hart, the New York Times obituary
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The volume of the work of the Court is staggering. When one adds
to that the factual complexity, the intellectual and legal intricacy of
many of the questions, the public importance of the problems, and
the difficulties inherent in reaching mutual understanding in any group
of nine men, the burden seems to me to be insupportable, and to be a
fair explanation of the source of some of the problems that some
thoughtful persons have found in the work of the Court in recent years.
The Bar should take the lead in developing legislation which will
reduce the burden on the Supreme Court. Its present jurisdictional
arrangements were established in 1925, thirty-five years ago, at a time
when the population of the country was about two-thirds of its
present size and economic complexity was less than half what it is
now. The time hag come for a change. If the bar does not aid the
Court in reducing its burden, then the bar must be content to accept
a considerable number of opinions which are turned out in a necessarily
rather superficial way, and without any opportunity, in substance, for
"the maturing of collective thought." There is no alternative. There
is only so much time in the day, and as the volume of work increases
the opportunity for reflective deliberation necessarily decreases.
In his Morrison Lecture, given before issue was drawn between
Hart and Arnold and Douglas, Dean Griswold had earlier stressed that
"the Supreme Court is now oppressed by mere volume and complexity of
its business" and urged the bar to take the leadership in devising ways
and means for its alleviation." ° Continuing, he concentrated on his own
special field of competence, declaring:
Indeed, I will even go so far as to say that the Supreme Court, hard
pressed for time as it is, does not do a very good job in the intricate and
specialized field of federal taxation. For instance, I may mention one
of its most recent decisions in the field-Flora v. United States, 357
U.S. 63 (1958)-where the Court held that a taxpayer who had paid
only part of a tax claimed to be due from him could not maintain a suit
to getit back. This leads to the bizarre result that a taxpayer who pays
stressed the significance of this contribution of his distinguished scholarly career.
N.Y. Times, March 25, 1969, at 56, col. 4.
" Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, foreword to The Suprene Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. RZv. 81, 84, 85-86 (1960).
Note that nearly another decade, with continuingly rapid increase in population and
in the complexity of economic, political and social problems, has passed since Dean
Griswold made these observations.
" Address by Dean Griswold to State Bar of California at Coronado, California,
Oct. 9, 1958, in 43 MAss. L.Q. 98 (October, 1958).

1969]

CURTAILMENT IN JURISDICTION

everything he has is wholly without remedy if he cannot pay the
whole tax assessed. This result was reached in the teeth of the
language of the statute, and on the basis of a statement of practice
which is demonstrably wrong. I venture the thought that this was a
result which would not have been reached if the court had had more
time for the consideration of the case. But, as things are, tax cases
inevitably have a low priority among all the cases the Supreme Court
has to decide. It would be in the interest of all concerned to' find a
way to relieve the Court from having to decide these cases, and many
other-non-constitutional-cases in the general area of administrative
law.6 1
Quoting Professor Kurland on the "enormity of the task that burdens
the Court," Professor Beaver in a recent article suggests in a footnote
that "[t] he great burden on the Court may help to explain the frequency
with which the Justices have urged the states to adjust their differences
by agreement with the consent of Congress." 62 In an earlier volume of this
Review, the present writer queried whether the heavy burden imposed
by the Court's continued adherence to the requirements of "constitutional
fact" is influencing the central judicial task of fashioning substantive
constitutional doctrine.6 3 Instanced for speculation are two significant
lines of constitutional development; that of Escobedo-Miranda-Mathis"
and the Reynolds-Lucas-Avery 5 line.66 Whereas the possibility to which
Professor Beaver adverts is not necessarily serious, there can be nothing
but deep concern if credible evidence is beginning to appear that the magnitude of the Court's workload-whether from sheer case volume, insistence upon independent review of facts controlling constitutionality,
1
Id.109.
Beaver, Common Law v. InternationalLaw Adjective Riles in the Original
urisdiction, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 62 n.301 (1968).
" Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 47 N.C.L.
Rv. 311 (1969). Reacting to the precursor of this article [Strong, The Persistent
Doctrine of "ConstitutionalFact,"46 N.C.L. REv. 223 '(1968)], Professor Maurice
Merrill agrees that the doctrine controls in civil liberties adjudications but denies
its validity with respect to Court review of administrative determinations. Merrill,
ConstitutionalFact: How Far Does Due Process Require the Independent Judginent of Judges?, 2 CREIGHTON L. REv. 45 (1968).
" Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
"Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
" Strong, Dilemmic Aspects of the Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 47
N.C.L. REv. 311, 327-32 '(1969). Primary attention is there devoted to th&esecond
line of cases, the first having been considered in Strong, The PersistentDoctrine of
"Constitutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REv. 223, 249-61 (1968).
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complexity of issues in constitutional and statutory interpretation, or all
of these-is jeopardizing the quality of the Court's decisional product.
Distressing experience with the deterioration of opinions and decisions of
overburdened state supreme, courts points unerringly to the hidden danger
in failure to work out some constructive form of major curtailment in the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court may
well be in greater danger from its supposed friends than from its acknowledged detractors.
Not all commentators share the views exemplified in the foregoing
pages.6 7 Even from their standpoint, however, the time has come to talk
of major curtailment in the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Past satisfaction does not guarantee future adequacy of the judicial product. The
rapidity of population growth and the continuing trend toward reliance
upon legal controls in all facets of life presage ever mounting caseloads
at all levels of state and federal judiciary, not excepting the courts of
final resort. There is a limit to what a Supreme Court justice can do,
even when fully dedicated to his great responsibilities and assisted by
able law clerks working around the clock. Beyond this crucial factor is
one of transcendental significance-the emergence of the Supreme Court
as a primary instrument of constitutional amendment. As Professor Dixon
has observed:
[I]t is certainly too late in the day to deny that courts do dramatically
and effectively change the Constitution. Supreme Court justices on
occasion admit to "amending" the Constitution, or at least accuse their
brethren of it, which amounts to the same thing.
Few now fail to perceive and admit that [constitutional
judicial review] is a major form of American policy-making. 8
In similar vein Professor Paul Kauper suggests
that we recognize realistically the creative role the Court has assumed
17 E.g., Arnold, supra note 57; Douglas, supra note 57; Hyman, Concerning the
Responsibility and Craftsmanship of the Judge: A Review of Julius Stone's LEGAL
SYSTEM

AND

LAWYER'S

REASONING,

in the Light of Recent Criticism of the

Supreme Court, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 347 (1964) (deficiencies can be shown only
by application of an impossible standard of excellence); Kalven, "Uninhibited,
Robust, and Wide-Open"---A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67
MicH. L. REv. 289, 300-02 (1968) ; Lewis, The Supreme Court and its Critics, 45
MINN. L. REV. 305, 319-32 (1961) (current deficiencies no greater than those of
the "old," unreconstructed Court). Cf. Bok, supra note 17, at 320.
s

Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Constitution? 66

MicH. L. Rxv. 931, 947 (1968).
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in maintaining the validity of the Constitution as a living document
responsive to our contemporary society and that we acknowledge
that the Court is free to and does use the Constitution as an instrument
for achieving what it regards as desirable changes in the political and
social order.6 9
There is nothing new in assertions that the Court employs its power
to declare on constitutionality to revise the fundamental document. They
are as old as constitutional judicial review itself. Passing over earlier
periods of displeasure with the Court, such assertions underlay the groundswell of criticism of the unreconstructed Court that culminated in the
celebrated constitutional crisis of 1937 in which Franklin RQosevelt called
for "a Supreme Court that will enforce the Constitution as writtenthat will refuse to amend the Constitution by the arbitrary exercise of
What is new is the
judicial power-amendment by judicial say-so.""'
growing acceptance of constitutional amendment by judicial interpretation as opposed to formal action under article V. With things now going
their way the liberals are of course in support, even to uttering contradictory cries that those favoring a constitutional convention on state
initiative "want to tamper with the Constitution." But acceptance comes
as well from others, like Professors Dixon and Kauper, who are not so
much enthusiastic as resigned to the fact, despite the paradox of vesting
such near-ultimate power in a nonelective body only remotely subject to
popular sovereignty." Much of the developing attitude can be traced to
fuller realization of the limitations of either mode of procedure under
article V save with respect to structural alterations such as those made by
recent amendments. The emerging situation is highlighted by the largely
solo effort of Mr. Justice Black to hold the Court back from using its
interpretive power "in order to 'keep the Constitution up to date' or 'to
bring it into harmony with the times.' It was never meant that this Court
" P. Kauper, The Alternative Amendment Process: Some Observations, 66
MicH. L. REV. 903, 918 (1968).
" Radio Address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 9, 1937, on Reorganization of the Supreme Court, 81 CONG. REC. A470 (1937).
11 Dixon, supra note 68; P. Kauper, supra note 69. See also Hearings on S.
2307 (Federal Constitutional Convention) before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 61 (1967)
(statement of Professor Alexander Bickel). But see Senator Joseph D. Tydings,
They Want to Tamper with the Constitution, SATURDAY EVENING PosT, June 17,
1967, at 10; Address by former Justice Arthur Goldberg before the American
College of Trial Lawyers, Aug. 9, 1969, as commented on in 55 A.L.A.J. 894

(1969).
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have such power, which in effect would make us a continuously function'
ing constitutional convention." 72
If the future functioning of the Supreme Court is to include, without
internal hesitancy or outside hindrance, major responsibility for adjusting
the Constitution to changing times and circumstances, then certainly
measures must be taken to restrict the scope of its jurisdiction as now
defined. For it is little short of awesome to place such power in a handful
of justices, no matter how able and even though subject to popular review
through the present article V or some revision thereof along lines suggested by Theodore Roosevelt's proposal nearly sixty years ago of
"recall of judicial decisions." 3 Opportunity for lengthy, unhurried deliberation, similar to that of the creative Marshall era, would be an
absolute minimum necessity. Not to take such protective action is assuredly to toy with the nation's fate.
Suggestions made during the last two decades for alleviating the
Court's burden offer only temporary palliatives, no matter how wellintentioned. This must in retrospect be the judgment passed on Professor
Hart's suggestion that the Court could be more efficient in the handling of
its docket, 4 and on the earlier proposal of Professors Moore and Vestal
for return to significant use of certification.75 Nor does mitigation of the
Court's workload through reduction in the extent of its obligatory jurisdiction, the control core of the Judges' Bill, any longer offer a route to
solution of the problem. Several reasons for this inadequacy have emerged
in the near half-century since that major reform. First, denials and dismissals of petitions for certiorari are now running better than eighty-five
per cent for the Appellate Docket and nearly ninety-five per cent for the
Miscellaneous Docket.76 It is true that these percentages were not far
below this level thirty years ago when they were defended during the
debate on the Roosevelt Court Bill. But judgment then was colored by the
fact that everyone of any sophistication knew that President Roosevelt's
"' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Mr.
justice Black's appeal to his Brothers might be more effective had lie not turned

a deaf ear when in the reapportionment cases of 1964 Justices Harlan and Stewart
expressed similar concern in vigorous dissents. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
589 (1964)

(Harlan, J., dissenting); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377

U.S. 713, 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
'See

W.

RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY 98-118 (1912).

7,Hart, supra note 56, at 84.

T Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1 (1949).
" The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 H~Av. L. REV. 95, 310 (1968); The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA v. L. REv. 62, 282 (1969).
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original reliance on these figures to support his proposal for increase in
Supreme Court personnel was a cover for his real purpose. 77 The attack
was understandably taken as one on the Court as an institution. In any
event, when denials and dismissals average to ninety per cent, there is
not much room left for further mitigation of judicial workload without
effectively stifling this major form of resort to the Court. Furthermore,
thirty years ago the theory that appeal was a matter of right was honored
in practice, whereas more recent years have witnessed the continuing
transformation of limited appeal jurisdiction from obligatory to discretionary."8 Thus, further relief through formal introduction of additional discretionary power in the Court would be minimal indeed. 79
Yet this is only a part of the story. Not overly long ago, Professor
Ernest Brown convincingly criticized "the Supreme Court's increasingly
frequent practice of summary decision on certiorari." ' His view was that
[u]nder the existing rules and recommended practices, summary
reversal on certiorari papers appears in many cases to raise serious
question whether there has not been decision without that hearing
usually thought due from judicial tribunals. Anguished or indignant
complaints to that effect in fruitless petitions for rehearing (as they
are formally styled) seem not without justification. It is possible in
any case that a brief or oral argument on the merits would present
"'The presidential message of February 5, 1937, accompanying submission of
the Bill, is reprinted in R. JAcxsox, THE STRUGGLE

FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

328-

37 (1941). The message is followed by the celebrated address of March 9, 1937,
in which the President disclosed the true motives behind the Bill. Id. 340-51. See
p. 15 supra.
" "Cases come to the Supreme Court either on petition for certiorari, an
avowedly discretionary procedure, or by appeal, which is ostensibly an obligatory
jurisdiction, but is in reality equally discretionary." Wiener, Handling a Case in
the Supremw Court, 12 STUDENT LAWYER 9 (1966). In an earlier, more technical
article, Attorney Wiener called attention to the statement of Chief Justice Warren in
his 1954 address to the American Law Insitute that "[i]t is only accurate to a
degree to say that our jurisdiction in cases on appeal is obligatory as distinguished
from discretionary on certiorari." Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rides, 68
HARv. L. REv. 20, 51 (1959). The latest revision of the Supreme Court Rules,

appearing at 388 U.S. 927, effects major changes in the Rules governing appeal
to assimilate them with the Rules governing petition for certiorari. For a review
of the new Rules, see Boskey & Gressman, The 1967 Changes in the Supreme
Court's Rules, 42 F.R.D. 139 (1967).

"'Prettyman, Petitioning the United States Supreme Court-A Primer for
Hopeful Neophytes, 51 VA. L. Rnv. 582 (1965), outlines the obstacles to attainment of Court review, whether by appeal or certiorari.

" Brown, Process of Law foreword to The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72
HARV. L. REv. 77 (1958).
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no more than the brief in opposition to the grant of certiorari. But
that can rarely be known to the Court in advance.8 '
To the possible defense that the Court has before it, under its Rules,
copies of the opinions below, Professor Brown's response was that "[t]he
Court is reviewing judgments, not opinions, as long as article III is
honored."8 2 To the defense that, again by reason of its Rules, the Court
has before it a transcript of the record, which would serve as a substitute
for argument on the merits, his response was that "[u]ntil the Constitution awards the Court a dispensing power, a procedure seems to require
some justification if it results in second-class decisions reversing federal
courts of appeals and state supreme courts. 8 8 Again,
[e]ven from a point of view which takes into account only the convenience and efficiency of the Court, the practice of summary reversal
on certiorari papers seems questionable. As the statistical chance increases that the brief in opposition to certiorari may be the only
opportunity for a comprehensive statement of the merits of the respondent's case, the chance that counsel will forego this opportunity
diminishes, inconsistent with the rules as the resultant practice might
84
be.
Finally,
[i]f the Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction to deal with problems of national legal significance, it hardly needs demonstration that
such matters warrant hearing on the merits. If the Court chooses to
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to act as a Court of Selected
Error, there is still the matter of a fair and adequate procedure to
determine when error exists. If summary decision on the merits is
warranted, the category of cases in which it is appropriate must not
be much broader than those in which the decision is 'clearly errone8
ous.' 5
Paradoxically, according to this view the Court ought to be deciding
more, not fewer, cases by full opinion after argument on the merits. The
uneasy feeling that this conclusion may well be true underlies Professor
81 Id. 80.
62

8

Id.

Id. 81.
8, Id.
" Id. 82. See also Komar, On the Reform of Appellate Procedures of the
United States Supreme Court, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 28 (1967), for the contention that the Court ought to be hearing and deciding more cases than it is.
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Henkin's quite recent evaluation of the Court's work, to which reference
has earlier been made." Cases like Mora v. McNamara raise for him
8 s7
"gnawing questions.
If, as the Court insists as it tears down obstacles to judicial review,
constitutional claims should be heard, should the Court retain a wide
discretion not to hear them? At least, is it time to redraw the line, to
reexamine the distribution between certiorari and appeal jurisdiction, so
as to give more constitutional claims 'an appeal as of right'? And,
incidentally, to reduce the discretion which the Court has in fact asserted
88
even in regard to appeals.
In view of the heavy reliance that, wisely or not, this country places upon
judicial determination of constitutional issues, it cannot be that the solution to the problem of Court overload lies in severe delimitation of its
jurisdiction in this class of cases. It is the present writer's view, for instance, that current jurisdictional restrictions arising from "standing"
requirements and the doctrine of "political questions" are inappropriate
for constitutional litigation-the result of long confusion of the two very
distinct judicial functions of constitutional review and ordinary review.
If this thesis be sound, 9 there is that much more basis for Professor
Henkin's misgivings regarding the present direction of solutional efforts.
On the other hand, severe restriction of final, unifying review in nonconstitutional cases offers no solution; such restriction presents "gnawing
questions" of its own, as already observed.

The time has come for an entirely new approach to the problem, an
approach that will bring significant relief to the Supreme Court while at
the same time not curtailing that scope of final review, constitutional and
otherwise, that is in the public interest.
The division of judicial labor that suggests itself is that between the
two major types of judicial review, for which in absence of agreed
terminology the present writer has proposed the terms "ordinary" and
"7See pp. 8-9 supra.

Henkin, supranote 32, at 89.
" Id. at 89 & n.89.
" The writer in future articles will urge the soundness of this thesis, basing
analysis on the ramifications of the distinction developed in Strong, Judicial Review:
A Tri-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-ConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L.
Rav. 249 (1967).
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"constitutional." 9 While the American judiciary participates significantly
in constitutional processes through the exercise of ordinary judicial review, review of constitutionality is a distinctive function; the unique thrust
of the pronouncement of a court as the ultimate guardian of a constitution
places the judiciary in a more sensitive relationship vis-4-vis both the
other branches of government and the sovereign people. An illustration
from academe brings the point home: the study of constitutional law is
the study of constitutional judicial review; exercise of ordinary judicial
review forms a large portion of the subject-matter of other law school
courses, in only some of which (such as administrative law and legislation)
is there realization of the part that the judiciary thereby plays in the total
constitutional structure.
Division of the Court's work between constitutional and ordinary
judicial review could be effected in either of two ways. One would involve
augmentation in Court personnel accompanied by internal division of
function. The other solution would be to leave with the present Court
final jurisdiction for review of constitutionality, transferring finality in
ordinary judicial review to one or more separate judicial bodies. If separation of function is to be complete, the now unique association of the
present Supreme Court with constitutional adjudication commends the
allocation suggested rather than the reverse. While internal division
might have the advantage of greater ease in the cross-certification of
cases, other policy considerations point to the desirability of the alternative solution. More likely of realization, for instance, would be the
evolution of distinctive procedures and practices appropriate to the exercise
of constitutional judicial review. Throughout the history of judicial
review of constitutionality, procedures and practices required for its functioning have been dominated by views of the judicial process traditional
to the historic exercise of ordinary judicial review, a quite different function. Proposals involving complete separation have recently been made
by an outstanding commentator9 1 and a distinguished federal judge. 92
" Strong, supra note 89, at 250-51.
Professor Philip Kurland proposes two courts of last resort: the present
Supreme Court for constitutional issues; and "a new court in the federal system
9"

[to which] would be assigned the power to review, at its discretion, all cases in-

volving the interpretation and application of federal statutes and common law,
whether arising in state or federal courts." Hearings on the Supreme Court, supra
note 55, at 653.
9" Judge Henry J. Friendly proposes three top courts: the present Supreme

Court for constitutional issues; a super court of appeals for final review of other
federal issues arising in lower courts; and a court of administrative appeals for
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Precedent can be found in the court organization of several nations that, by
adaptation from this country, have added to the traditional judicial power
of ordinary review that of constitutional review. 3
Either type of proposal stirs constitutional difficulties by reason of the
fact that the Instrument vests "the judicial power of the United States
... in one Supreme Court." To Chief Justice Hughes, expressing himself
in his celebrated letter to Senator Burton Wheeler written during debate
on the Roosevelt Court Plan, "[t]he Constitution does not appear to
authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a Supreme
Court functioning in effect as separate courts." 94 With respect to internal
division, Justice Jackson perceived "very practical difficulties" in such a
step. 5 On the other hand, Mr. Justice Stone has been quoted to the
effect that he had "never formed any opinion on the constitutional point
in question,"9 0 and very recently it has been contended that Congress does
have the power to enlarge the Court through creation of internal divisions. 7 In any event, these views do not reach the question of the
validity of internal separation based upon structured differentiation of
function; the views expressed have had to do with possible constitutional
limitation on adoption of the practice of some state supreme courts in
sitting in divisions as a means of expediting the exercise of total, undifferentiated jurisdiction of all types. A valid distinction, relevant to
the constitutional issue of the meaning of one Supreme Court, can be
drawn between these two arrangements.
Concededly, any literalist approach to interpretation of the constitucases from the major federal administrative agencies. Friendly, A Federal Court
of Administrative Appeals?, 74 CASE & CoM. 23, 26 (1969).
" FEDERAL CONSTIrTIION oF AUSTRIA chap. IIIB (Judicial Power), chap. VI
(Administrative Court, Constitutional Court) (1920, re-enacted 1945), in 1 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 127-29, 141-46 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
PEASLEE]; BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY pt. IX (Federal
Constitutional Court, Supreme Federal Court) (1955), in 2 PEASLEE 48-50; CoNSTITUTION OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC Pt. II, tit. IV, sec. 1 (magistrature), pt. II,
tit. VI, sec. 1 (Constitutional Court) (1948), in 2 PEAsLEE 496-97, 501-02; CONSTITUTION OF VENEZUELA tit. V, chap. IV (Federal Court, Court of Cassation) (1953),

in 3 PEASLEE 722-23. In Austria, Italy and Venezuela, the jurisdiction of the court
exercising constitutional judicial review extends also to some other matters, such
as election disputes, but in the large the separation is distinct.
S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1937).
gs R.
JACKsoN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GovERNMENT21 (1955).
" Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR's Court Plan, 61 YALE LJ. 791, 806

n.94 (1952).

°' Komar, On the Reform of Appellate Proceduresof tl United States Supreme
Court, 44 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 28 (1967).
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tional stricture against diffusion of judicial power at the apex makes hard
going for a proposal to create a separate court with final jurisdiction in all
cases of ordinary judicial review. Some negative encouragement is available from the fact that Chief Justice Hughes thought two or more Supreme
Courts to be no more violative of article III than one Supreme Court functioning in two or more divisions. If there are interpretational paths
around the latter obstacle, as can be contended, the same should be true
with respect to the former. In either instance, departure from literalist
interpretation could be justified only on a demonstration that two fundamentally distinctive facets of judicial power are involved. Given such
a demonstration, as can be made with respect to constitutional and ordinary
judicial review, the underlying purpose of the stricture against diffusion at
the level of finality is served by provision of one Supreme Court for each
type of exercise.
Supportive reasoning is possible from section 2 of article III. The
delineation there of federal judicial power reads overwhelmingly in terms
of judicial review in its historic signification; among the many "heads" of
judicial power set forth only one, that of cases arising under the Constitution, affords a foothold for the exercise of constitutional judicial review.
Inclusion of this head of jurisdiction came late in the Convention. The
Committee of Detail, in its full Report made on August 6, had proposed
that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases
arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States . . ..
By reason of the thorough debate on this Report in the Convention, it
was not until August 27 that consideration of the Judiciary Article, then
Article XI, was reached. At that time Doctor Johnson from Connecticut
successfully moved for the insertion of the words "this Constitution and
the" immediately before the word "laws." 9 9 From Madison's Journal and
other contemporaneous sources it is difficult to determine whether by this
slight alteration in the language of a provision for interpretation of Congressional legislation it was intended to add an entirely new dimension to
the federal judicial power. It is this uncertainty that has produced the
much-mooted question of the textual adequacy of the Constitution for
judicial review of constitutionality.
If Mr. Justice Jackson, Judge Learned Hand and others are correct
98 J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 458 (A. Scott ed. 1893).
" Id. 617. On the same day the words "The judicial power" were substituted
for "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." Id.
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that article III does not provide for constitutional judicial review, 0 0 the
exercise of which must therefore be justified on grounds of extra-constitutional acceptance, then there is basis for going outside the constitutional
text for authority to create a second federal court of last resort. On the
other hand, if Professors Hart and Wechsler and those of their view are
correct in their contention that the text of section 2 is adequate to support
the exercise of constitutional judicial review,' 01 section 1 ought to be
read with sufficient liberality to permit one Supreme Court for the type
of judicial review largely contemplated by article III and one Supreme
Court for the functionally and historically distinct type for which provision
was made late in the actions of the Convention. Although on either
approach the constitutionality of two separate Supreme Courts is debatable,
the present writer will follow Judge Friendly and Professor Kurland in
assuming constitutionality for purposes of considering solutions to the
Court's predicament.
Structurally, the solution proposed could be effected without major
alteration in either the primary jurisdictional statutes or federal court
organization. The questionable interpretation in Murdock v. City of
Memphis 0 2 of the 1867 Congressional revision of section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 remains in effect; Supreme Court review of state
court decisions is limited to federal questions raised therein. Congress
has never seen fit to test the validity of a broader-based jurisdiction despite
opinion that it could be extended at least to non-federal aspects of cases
containing federal questions and perhaps even to cases falling within other
heads of the federal judicial power but litigated in state courts by virtue
Accordingly, present sections 1257 and
of concurrent jurisdiction.0
1 R. JAcxsoN, supra note 95, at 22; L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27-28
(1958); Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12
MICH. L. REV. 538 (1914).

HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
17 (1953); cf. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review,
66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 197 (1952).
101

H. M.

SYSTEm

U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
Neither Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting in Murdock, nor former Justice
Curtis in his brief therein [fully reported in B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE,
AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 59-63 (2d
ed. 1896)] had any doubts as to the constitutionality of statutory authorization of
Court review of an entire case provided it included a federal question. Mr. Justice
Storey's reasoning in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816),
is broad enough to support extension of review to cases, litigated in state courts,
within other heads of federal judicial power. Cf. Tracy v. Ginsberg, 205 U.S.
170 (1907), where the Court affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts on failure of the federal question but diversity of citizenship
10287
108

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

1258 of title 28 United States Code would require no change, for under
those sections the great bulk of the workload of the Court calls for the
exercise of constitutional judicial review. What is technically not of that
type, as illustrated by issues of federal pre-emption and adequacy of independent state ground, is so closely related thereto as to constitute but
"an exception that proves the rule." The alterations would have to
come
in the present extent of appellate review of the lower federal courts, wherein
the Court engages in both types of judicial review just as do the highest
state courts in relation to the courts inferior to them.
Even here, perhaps surprisingly, the jurisdictional statutes would not
require the degree of alteration one might suppose. With respect to direct
review of federal district courts,' 0 4 section 1252 of title 28 U.S.C. could
stand as it is. In its application to sections 2281 and 2282, section 1253
would require no revision, but it would have to be reworded to cut back
to challenges of constitutionality its present reach as regards section 2325
and similar provisions.'
The Criminal Appeals Act, section 3731 of title
18 U.S.C., would necessitate alteration to restrict direct appeal, as Professor Kurland has suggested, to criminal cases "in which the defendant
has not been put in jeopardy and in which a trial court has found a statute
of the United States unconstitutional. . .. "106 Thus delimited, all direct
appeals under these sections would continue to bring the entire case before
the Supreme Court, thus avoiding the truncation of litigation involving
both constitutional and non-constitutional issues yet significantly lightening the Court's caseload.
The infrequency of litigation of constitutional questions in direct appeal
under the Expediting Act, section 29 of title 15 U.S.C., suggests that
the present Court be relieved of this heavy burden. Similarity of situation
would suggest the same treatment of those provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that vest jurisdiction in
existed. Absence of statutory authorization for review based on diversity presumably
explains the Court's failure to reach the issue of constitutionality of such an extension.
"'There exists extensive criticism of direct review [see C. WRIrHT, FEDERAL
COURTs § 105 (1963)], some of which would be eliminated under current proposals
of the American Law Institute. ALI STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 239-49 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968). Direct

review was abandoned in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 after considerable reliance
upon1 5it in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
° E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 217 (1964).
Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Crimiml Appeals Act: A Suggestion

for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 419, 462-63 (1961).
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three-judge district courts with direct appeal to the Supreme Court."'7
The reach of the decisions in Katzenbach v. McClung,"'8 South Carolina
v. Katzenbach,"9 and Katzenbach v. Morgan" makes it unlikely that
constitutional issues will long loom significant in litigation under those
Acts. In consequence, application of the proposed principle of allocation
of final reviewing responsibility on the basis of the fundamental distinction between constitutional and ordinary judical review calls for freeing the Supreme Court of all this direct appellate jurisdiction. The alteration could easily be made by amending section 29 of title 15 U.S.C. and the
six cited sections of 42 U.S.C. to read that appeal from the final judgment
of such courts will lie, not to the Supreme Court, but only to the new court
or courts to be created to exercise such final ordinary judicial review. It
would be sufficient that there be included in title 28 U.S.C. a general
provision for certification to the Supreme Court of any constitutional issue
arising in the course of ordinary judicial review. If, however, it were
deemed undesirable as a matter of policy to take these important categories of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court pending development of
confidence in and respect for a substitute court, the timing of this transfer
of function could be delayed. The proposal here made for a new approach
to the problem of excessive burden on the Supreme Court of the United
States does not require unyielding adherence to a theory of division on
the basis of type of judicial review.
Section 1255 of title 28 U.S.C., according certiorari and certification
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Court of Claims,
would require revision so as to siphon off for disposition elsewhere litigation not involving issues of constitutionality. Revision would also be
required with respect to section 1256, which now provides undifferentiated
certiorari jurisdiction in the Court over determinations by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. Over the broad range of jurisdiction of the
United States Courts of Appeals, provided by sections 1291, 1292 and
2342 of title 28 U.S.C. together with scattered sections in many other
titles, the Supreme Court now exercises review under the provisions of
section 1254 of title 28.111 Of the three subdivisions of section 1254, the
10742 U.S.C. §§1971(g), 1973b(a), 1973(c), 1973h(c), 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6b
(Supp. III, 1968).
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379 U.S. 294 (1964).

109 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1"-28 U.S.C. § 2350, added in 1966, overlaps § 1254 by specifying Court review,
as provided by § 1254(1) and § 1254(3), of "[a]n order granting or denying an
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second would need no change; the present restriction of "the review on
appeal.., to the federal questions presented" effects total limitation. With
respect to the first and third subdivisions, it would be necessary to restrict
certiorari and certification, respectively, to constitutional and closely related issues. The Court's final jurisdiction in exclusively ordinary judicial
review, thus taken from it by revision of sections 1254, 1255 and 1256,
would pass to a new court or courts to be established for the purpose.
The exercise of this ordinary judicial review could be divided among
several new courts, each specializing in a major type of it. Judge Friendly's suggestion contemplates two courts other than the Supreme Court
of the United States, one for federal administrative determinations and
the other for remaining cases not involving a substantial constitutional
claim. 1 2 Greater proliferation could be effected along lines that would
specialize the review of federal antitrust, labor, and tax cases. But while
judicial specialization would have its merits, such countervailing considerations as the desirability of a generalist approach to jurisdiction in
ordinary review and of dealing with one problem at a time suggest the merit
of Professor Kurland's proposal of a single new judicial body for resolution of nonconstitutional issues."' Unlike the Commerce Court,114 the
Emergency Court of Appeals," 5 and some recent suggestions,'1 " the common feature of which is the introduction of an additional tier of intermediate appellate courts, the proposed court for ordinary judicial review
would be, along with the present Supreme Court, a court of last resort.
It could be, and it would have to be, an article III court, dividing with the
Supreme Court, at the top appellate level, the exercise of the judicial
interlocutory injunction under Section 2349(b) of this title and a final judgment of

the court of appeals in a proceeding to review under this chapter... ." The chapter
review of the orders of certain federal administrative agencies.
concerns
11
Friendly, supra note 92, at 26.
" Hearings on the Supreme Court, supra note 55, at 653.
""Act of June 10, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, repealed Act of Oct. 22, 1913,
ch. 32, 38 Stat. 219. See Baker, The Commerce Court-Its Origin, Its Powers and
Its Judges, 20 YALE L.J. 555 (1911).
"'Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 32. See Laws, The Work of the United
States Emergency Court of Appeals, 11 J.D.C.B. Ass'N 100 (1944).
"1For instance, Weiner, Federal Regional Courts: A Solution for the Cer-

tiorariDilenma, 49 A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963), has proposed creation of three or four

regional United States courts, the twin objective to be the achievement of full
review of more decisions of the Courts of Appeals while lessening the Supreme
Court's present burden. Cf. Note, Intermediate Appellate Review Boards for Adninistrative Agencies, 81 HARv. L. RZv. 1325 (1968), proposing intermediate
appellate review boards in federal administrative agencies in order to relieve "the
huge caseload of most agencies." Id. 1326.
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power of the United States as constitutionally defined. In view of the
function of the new judicial body and of its place in the overall judicial
system, it might well be christened the "Supreme Federal Court" after
the German court of analogous character." 7
Under earlier views of the scope of Congressional power to delineate
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, there would be no
question of the constitutionality of the proposed plan for alleviation of
the Court's burden. Congressional power was deemed well-nigh unlimited, provided its regulations were legitimate restrictions on jurisdiction
and not attempts to dictate how that jurisdiction should be exercised
in the resolution of justiciable controversies. 118 Recent years have witnessed challenge of the earlier views by some commentators.11 9 But only
under contentions of extreme limitation on Congressional power would
the present proposal run afoul of article III. For, far from involving
any opposition to the Supreme Court, it represents an attempt to free the
Court of heavy overload in order that it can perform more effectively its
great mission of constitutional adjudication. No diminution in the
Court's protected original jurisdiction would be essential to realization
of the proposed allocation of judicial power. Although that jurisdiction
technically encompasses more than exercise of constitutional judicial
review, the Court's business under section 1251 of title 28 U.S.C. is today
essentially that of resolving, beyond constitutional questions, only issues
of interstate or interfederal conflict quite analogous thereto. The future
will see little Court expenditure of time on such issues as were involved
in Georgiav. Tennessee Copper Co."20 and Georgia v. PennsylvaniaRailroad Co. 2'
"1 2 PEASLEE, supra note 93, at 48-50.
"'Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence,

35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949), was a plea by former Justice Owen Roberts for a constitutional amendment to overcome Congress's assumedly unlimited power over the
court's appellate jurisdiction. The leading cases continue to be United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) and Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1869).
...
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 1362 (1953); Merry, Scope of the
Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction:Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53
(1962); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960). There is an excellent collection of
relevant cases, citations and comments in D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 91-102
(1968). However, there continues to be no doubt of the power of Congress to
create other federal courts and prescribe their jurisdiction. Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182 (1943).
120206 U.S. 230 (1907).
324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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There is irony, to be sure, in the proposed solution to the dilemma
posed by the mounting workload of the present Court. Both the Montesquian climate of political opinion in which the Constitution was drafted
and the phraseology of article III itself made it clear that "[t]he judicial
power of the United States" was conceived as basically that of ordinary
judicial review. With respect to constitutional judicial review there is not
only the previously considered question of textual adequacy 12 but the "far
more fundamental . . . issue of the instrument's consistency with the

necessary predicates of judicial review of constitutionality, in light of the
co-ordinate character of the three departments of government so clearly
postulated by it. .

.

.No attempt at reconciliation has ever satisfactorily

met Mr. Justice Gibson's analysis in Eakin v. Raub.""' It would, therefore, be ironical to divest the Supreme Court of the United States of the
very type of review that it was clearly contemplated would be exercised
by the Court at the final appellate level and occasionally in original jurisdiction. Yet in view of the transcendental importance that constitutional
judicial review has come to have, it would be laying a hand on the Ark
of the Covenant to propose that the great issues of constitutionality be
channeled into an entirely new court for ultimate resolution. Accordingly,
if the demonstrated need for relieving the Supreme Court of its mountingly
heavy workload is to be met by employment of the basic differentiation in
function that is here proposed, the present Court must be left with final
authority in constitutional judicial review and the more traditional type
of review transferred to a new judicial tribunal possessed of equal finality
within its jurisdiction.
Among those appreciative of the full import of the federal judicial
function, the new tribunal need not suffer by comparison so far as the
significance of its performance is concerned. Happily, the annual statistical
analysis of the Supreme Court's "business," provided by the Harvard
Law Review, discloses, for cases decided on the merits in full opinions,
the distribution as between those in which the principal issue is of constitutional dimensions and those in which it is not. While the steady rise in
primarily constitutional adjudication attained a majority position at the
1968 Term, the percentage of principally non-constitutional adjudication
122

See pp. 22-23 smpra.

Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional Concept of AdministrativeConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 111, 118-19 (1967).
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remains significant.' 24 Of the cases reviewed from the lower federal
courts, the principal issue continues to be a non-constitutional one in the
majority of instances although the ratio is declining.' 25 Thus despite
growing emphasis upon constitutional matters the present Supreme Court
remains a truly two-dimensional judicial body; it is a Supreme Federal
Court as well as a Supreme Constitutional Court.
Even more significant than this indication of the quantitative importance of the new court would be the qualitative measure of its work.
Correctly understood, ordinary judicial review is an integral part of constitutional law; it is the part of constitutional law that, vouchsafed to the
judiciary by the doctrine of separation of powers, enables courts to enforce
the rule of law through insistence upon both interpretation of legislative
action and canalization of executive discretion before governmental sanction becomes final as to the individual. The vital import of ordinary
judicial review for limitation of governmental power was not lost on
Bishop Hoadly, who is so often quoted for his penetrating observation
that "whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes,
and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."' 26 Nor was it lost on
Alexander Hamilton, as is attested by a paragraph in his celebrated
"examination of the the judiciary department of the proposed government":
124

PrincipalIssue
Term of
Court Constitutional Other
86
26
1958
77
41
1960
81
1962
36
61
53
1964
63
56
1966
55
65
1968

Total
112
118
117
114
119
120

73
75
77
79
81
83

Reference
HARv. L. REV. Table III facing 130 (1959)
HARv.L. REv. Table III facing 86 (1961)
HARV. L. REv. Table III facing 84 (1963)
HAgv. L. REv. Table II facing 106 (1965)
HAuv. L. REv. Table II 128-29 (1967)
HARV. L. REV. Table II 280-81 (1969).
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Other
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1958

5

71

1960
1962
1964
1966

21
12
24
19

67
66
57
61

36
1968
Data from issues of the HAv. L. REv., supra note 124.
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Quoted in J. GRAY, NATUL E AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 125 (2d ed. 1921).
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But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that
the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes
extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular
classes of citizens by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness
of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity
and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate
the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it
operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who,
perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to
-be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled
by the very motives of the injustice they meditate to qualify their
attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon
1 27
the character of our governments, than but few may be aware of.
With the development of constitutional judicial review following upon
Chief Justice Marshall's exposition in Marbury v. Madison,1 28 the failure
of Mr. Justice Gibson's challenge in Eakin v. Raub,'2 and particularly
the extension of this type of review from indirect to direct constitutional
limitations,'3 the constitutional dimensions of ordinary judicial review
faded from attention, their significance consequently discounted. No curIf Dr.
rently used casebook so much as mentions Prohibitionsdel Roy.'
32
for
its
supposed
at
all,
it
is
attention
Bonham's Case' receives any
assertion by Coke of judicial power to determine constitutionality whereas Blackstone in the Commentaries.. and the better scholarship since that
time have made it clear that Bonham's Case, like Prohibitions del Roy,
was a precedent-making exercise of ordinary judicial review.'3 4
This predominant attitude receives specific focus in the leading analysis
of the derogation cannon of statutory interpretation, which is to the
effect that statutes detracting from the policy thrust of the common law
11" THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231-32 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966). Cf. id. No. 81,
at 244-45.
1' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12 S.&R. 330 (Pa. 1825). See Strong, supra note 123.
I"'Id. 119-20.
"'12 Co. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1612).
a8 Co. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 647 (1610).
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91.
is' Boudin, Lord Coke and the American Doctrineof JudicialPower, 6 N.Y.U.L.
Rv. 223, 236-46 (1929); Thorne, Dr. Bonhar's Case, 54 L.Q. REv. 543 (1938).
There have been analyses to the contrary, all but the latest of which are cited in
Strong, supra note 89, at 251 n.74. James Otis' assertions in Paxton's Case come
within the license of advocacy.
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are to be strictly construed. Treating as a part of that canon the rule that
statutes in derogation of natural or common right are to be similarly
treated by the courts, the analysts say:
It is quite understandable that the English courts would lay store
by this "sub-canon"; they do not have recourse to written constitutional
limitations on governmental action. The courts certainly should be
sensitive to encroachments upon individual liberty. In the United
States, however, we depend upon our bills and declarations of rights to
safeguard personal liberty. It is a commonplace, moreover, that our
courts generally favor interpretation consistent with constitutionality.
The answer here, in sum, is that there is no demonstrated need, in our
system, for extraconstitutional judicial restraints on governmental
action in the interest of individual freedom.13 5
Some grasp of the full reach of ordinary judicial review survives, however,
the country's heady preoccupation with judicial review of constitutionality. 136 Indications of renewed appreciation of the validity of the insight
of Hamilton and Hoadly, which the writer believes he detects,1 7 are persuasive that in the fullness of time the new tribunal here proposed for final
jurisdiction in ordinary judicial review would not unduly suffer by comparison with the present Court, reconstituted as the nation's constitutional
court of last resort.
1.Fordham

& Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common
Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 438, 444-45 (1950).
...
E.g., Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation,3
VAND. L. REv. 382, 382-84 (1950) ; Tannenhaus, Judicial Process:Judicial Review,
in 8 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 303, 304 (1968).

" Strong, supra note 89, at 253 n.79.

